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he recent slight improvement in the GDP growth rates in the eurozone (which is 
actually of microscopic proportions) has led European policy-makers to proclaim 
victory and assert that the austerity programmes imposed within the eurozone are 
paying off. These same policy-makers clearly feel vindicated and take the small turnaround 
in growth rates as evidence that austerity, although painful, works by creating confidence in 
the future.1  
But is this really the case? In this Commentary we argue, first, that the improvement in the 
eurozone business cycle is the result of the ECB’s announcement of its Outright Monetary 
Transaction (OMT) programme, and second, that austerity has left a legacy of unsustainable 
debt levels that will test the political resilience of the debtor countries. 
The Commission or the ECB? 
Those who claim that the improvement of the business cycle in the eurozone is due to the 
austerity measures imposed by the European Commission have a lot of explaining to do. 
They need to demonstrate that the austerity measures have created confidence, which in turn 
has improved consumption and investment, and all this at a time of rising unemployment. 
The empirical evidence for this confidence effect is extremely poor (see Guardajo et al., 2011). 
A more plausible explanation for the (slight) recovery is the OMT-programme announced in 
July 2012 and implemented in September 2012. The effect of this announcement led to a 
dramatic fall in the long-term government bond rates in the troubled eurozone countries. In 
countries like Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal the spreads with the German bond rate 
more than halved in a short period of time. There is no evidence that this fall was related to 
improvements in fundamental economic variables (such as the debt-to-GDP ratios and the 
external debt). In fact, these fundamentals continued to deteriorate after September 2012. All 
this would suggest that it is the ECB-announcement alone that is responsible for the dramatic 
lowering of the spreads. 
These lower spreads, in turn, had the effect of reducing the funding costs of troubled 
eurozone governments and helped to create a more positive environment around the 
eurozone and its future. It is therefore much more plausible to argue that if there was a 
                                                      
1 See Schaüble, Financial Times, 16 September, 2013. 
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Source: IMF, Fiscal Monitor Database, April 2013. 
Note: i) fiscal contraction (austerity) is defined as the change in the structurally 
adjusted primary government budget from 2009-12. ii) In the case of Greece, we 
do not take the debt restructuring of 2012 into account, which reduced the Greek 
debt ratio by 30%. 
We show the nature of this deflationary process in Figure 3, where we present the same 
austerity measure on the horizontal axis and the decline in GDP during the same period 
(2009-12). We observe a strong negative relation, i.e. the stronger the austerity programme, 
the deeper the decline in GDP. The estimated equation suggests that on average for every 1% 
increase in austerity, output declines by 1.4%. This is in line with the results obtained by 
other researchers and the IMF, indicating that the fiscal multiplier exceeds 1 (see Auerbach & 
Gorodnichenko, 2011; Blanchard & Leigh, 2013).  
What is rarely emphasised is that the strongly negative output effects of the austerity 
programmes made them particularly ineffective at reducing overall budget deficits – see 
Figure 4. Again, this shows the austerity measure on the horizontal axis. We now have the 
change in the overall government budget balance on the vertical axis. The regression line 
shows that, on average, a 1% increase in austerity only leads to a 0.5% improvement in the 
budget balance. Put another way, in order to improve the budget balance by 1%, an austerity 
programme of at least 2% is necessary. Given our measure of the fiscal multiplier of 1.4, this 
also implies a drop in GDP of 2.8%. Thus, the eurozone austerity programmes imposed a 
very unfavourable trade-off for the periphery countries: in order to improve their 
government budget balances by 1% a sacrifice of 2.8% of GDP was necessary.   
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Figure 2. Change government debt/GDP ratio (%) 
and Austerity (% GDP)  during 2009-124 | DE GRAUWE & JI 
 
 
Sources: IMF, Fiscal Monitor Database, April 2013 and European Commission, AMECO. 
 
 
Source: IMF, Fiscal Monitor Database, April 2013. 
Some observers have argued that this is a necessary price to pay to redress the disequilibria 
in the eurozone (see Gros, 2013). But is this so? The issue is not whether or not the periphery 
had to engage in austerity. They had no choice (although they should have been allowed 
more time). The issue is whether for the eurozone as a whole a more symmetrical adjustment 
might have improved the unfavourable trade-off between budget balance and economic 
growth in the periphery. It is our contention that a more symmetrical fiscal adjustment – 
whereby the creditor nations agreed to stimulate their economies – would have reduced the 
price the periphery had to pay (in terms of lost output) to achieve a given improvement in 
their government budget balances.  
y = ‐1.3889x + 6.4349
R² = 0.8941
‐20
‐15
‐10
‐5
0
5
10
‐5 0 5 1 01 52 0
G
r
o
w
t
h
 
o
f
 
G
D
P
Austerity
Figure 3. Cumulative GDP Growth and Austerity 
during 2009-12 
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Another way to see the validity of this argument is as follows. The imposition of austerity 
programmes in the eurozone has fallen victim to the ‘fallacy of composition’. What works for 
one nation fails to work when every nation applies the same policies. When one nation is 
forced to deleverage through austerity (i.e. is trying to save more) this may work when it is 
alone in doing so. In that case, its attempt to increase its savings and thereby create a current-
account surplus is facilitated by the fact that the others continue to dissave, i.e. they accept 
running current-account deficits. When, however, all countries try to save more at the same 
time, i.e. they all attempt to create current-account surpluses each country’s attempt to do so 
makes it harder for the others to achieve their objectives. As a result, they are forced to 
increase their austerity efforts. In the end, they are no more successful but GDP will be lower 
everywhere.  
It is surprising that the European Commission, as the guardian of the interests of the 
eurozone as a whole, did not take the system-wide implications of generalised austerity 
programmes into account. This may have something to do with the fact that the Commission 
acted as an agent defending the interests of the creditor nations, and not the interests of the 
eurozone as a whole. It is high time that the Commission takes up its role of defending the 
interests of the debtor nations with the same vigour that it defends the interests of the 
creditors. It is also time that the Commission insists, and possibly sends Troikas, to the 
creditor nations to ensure that they fulfil their side of bargain in the adjustment process.  
How temporary are the high debt levels?  
The failure to impose symmetrical fiscal policies has left a legacy of unsustainable debt levels 
in the periphery. Some observers have argued that the strong increase in the debt-to-GDP 
ratios is something observed in all recessions and therefore temporary (see, for example, 
Schmieding, 2013). Of course, everything on earth is temporary in some sense. Given the size 
of the build-up of government debt ratios in the eurozone’s periphery, the temporary nature 
of this build-up may become quite long drawn out.  
In the following table we show what ‘temporary’ may mean. The table calculates the number 
of years it will take for the peripheral countries with high government debt levels to halve 
these debt levels. We show the results under relatively favourable macroeconomic 
circumstances, i.e. assuming that the nominal interest rate on the debt has dropped and 
equals the nominal growth of GDP (a condition that is not yet met in these countries). The 
table shows that even when these countries manage to maintain a high primary surplus of 
4% for many years (which today they do not reach at all) it will still take between 12 to 22 
years to halve the debt. In fact, with the exception of Ireland, these countries have not yet 
been able to stabilise their debt levels, so the numbers in the table underestimate the number 
of years that will be needed to halve their debt levels. The issue is whether their political 
systems will have enough resilience to maintain such ‘temporary’ austerity programmes in 
order to slowly and painfully draw down the levels of debt.  
Table 1. Number of years required for peripheral countries to halve their debt levels 
 
Debt-to-GDP 
ratio (%) in 2013 
Number of years needed to halve 
the debt levels 
     Primary surplus 
     2%  3%  4% 
Spain  100 25  16  12 
Ireland/Portugal  120 30  20  15 
Italy  130 32  21  16 
Greece  180 50  30  22 6 | DE GRAUWE & JI 
 
Conclusion 
One effect of the intense austerity imposed on the debtor nations is a sharp increase in the 
government debt ratios in these countries. This increase is to a large extent due to the poor 
effectiveness of austerity programmes. The latter suffered from the well-known ‘fallacy of 
composition’ problem. Austerity programmes that can work in isolated cases fail to work 
well when every country imposes austerity at the same time. We have argued that this 
fallacy of composition made these austerity programmes both ineffective and costly for the 
periphery. Ineffective in that they required a lot of austerity to move the government budget 
only a little way; costly in that they led to large output losses for a given austerity 
programme. This could have been avoided by more enlightened and symmetrical budgetary 
policies, whereby the inevitable austerity of the debtor nations was compensated by fiscal 
stimulus in the creditor nations. Such symmetrical budgetary policies would not have put all 
the adjustment costs on the debtor nations, but would have spread it on both the debtors and 
the creditors (who bear equal responsibility for the crisis).  
Consequently, southern debtor nations now face a legacy of unsustainable debt that will 
drag them down for years, if not decades to come. The failure of the creditor nations and the 
European Commission representing these nations to think in terms of the interests of the 
system as a whole will return with a vengeance when the creditors have to accept a 
restructuring of the debt of the periphery.   
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